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Abstract— Dynamic games are an effective paradigm for
dealing with the control of multiple interacting actors. Current
algorithms for solving these problems either rely on Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) methods, dynamic programming (DP),
differential dynamic programming (DDP), or an iterative best
response approach (IBR). The first two approaches have strong
theoretical guarantees; however they becomes intractable in
high-dimensional real-world applications. The third approach
is grounded in the success of iLQR. It is scalable, but it cannot
handle constraints. Finally, the iterative best response algorithm
is a heuristic approach with unknown convergence properties,
and it can suffer from stability and tractability issues. This
paper introduces ALGAMES (Augmented Lagrangian GAME-
theoretic Solver), a solver that handles trajectory optimization
problems with multiple actors and general nonlinear state and
input constraints. We evaluate our solver in the context of
autonomous driving on scenarios involving numerous vehicles
such as ramp merging, overtaking, and lane changing. We
present simulation and timing results demonstrating the speed
and the ability of the solver to produce efficient, safe, and
natural autonomous behaviors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling a robot in an environment where it interacts
with other actors is a complex task. Traditional approaches in
the literature adopt a partitioned approach. First, predictions
of other actors’ trajectories are computed, then they are fed
into a trajectory optimizer that considers them as immutable
obstacles. This approach is limiting because the effect of the
robot’s trajectory on the other actors is ignored. Moreover,
it can lead to the “freezing robot” problem that arises when
the planner finds that all paths to the goal are unsafe [1].
The consequence is that the robot stops moving or executes
unnecessary anti-collision maneuvers.
For this reason, dealing with the game-theoretic aspect of
the planning problem is a critical issue that has a broad range
of applications. For instance, in autonomous driving, ramp
merging, lane changing, intersection crossing, and overtaking
maneuvers comprise some degree of game-theoretic interac-
tions [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Other potential applications
include mobile robots navigating in crowds, like package
delivery robots, tour guides, or domestic robots. Also, robots
interacting with people in factories such as mobile robots, or
fixed-base multi-link manipulators. Finally, it is applicable
in competitive settings, e.g. drone and car racing [8], [9].
In this work, we propose to solve constrained multi-
player general-sum dynamic games. In dynamic games, the
players’ strategies are sequences of decisions. It is important
1Department of Mechanical Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford,
USA simonlc@stanford.edu
2Department of Aeronautics & Astronautics, Stanford University, Stan-
ford, USA {schwager,zacmanchester}@stanford.edu
Fig. 1. Sequence of images depicting the trajectories obtained by solving
for Nash equilibrium strategies. The images appear in chronological order
from left to right. The vehicles achieve a ramp merging and a lane change
while avoiding collision with other vehicles and respecting road boundaries.
to notice that unlike traditional optimization problem, non-
cooperative games have no “optimal” solution. Depending
on the structure of the game, asymmetry between players,
etc., one achieves different concepts of solutions. In this
work, we search for Nash equilibrium solutions. This type
of equilibrium models symmetry between the players; all
players are treated equally. At such equilibria, no player can
reduce his cost by unilaterally changing his strategy. For
extensive details about the game-theory concepts addressed
in this paper, we refer readers to the work of Bressan [10]
and Basar et al. [11].
Our solver is aimed at finding a Nash equilibrium for
multi-player dynamic games, and can handle general nonlin-
ear state and input constraints. This is particularly important
for robotic applications, where the agents often interact
through their desire to avoid collisions with one another
or with the environment. Such interaction is most natu-
rally, and most correctly, represented as (typically nonlinear)
state constraints. This is a crucial point that sets game-
theoretic methods for robotics apart from game-theoretic
methods in other domains, such as economics, behavioral
sciences, and robust control. In these domains, the agent
interactions are traditionally represented in the objective
functions themselves, and these games typically have no
state or input constraints. In mathematical game theory, Nash
equilibria with constraints are referred to as Generalized
Nash Equilibria [12]. Hence, in this paper we present an
augmented Lagrangian solver for finding Generalized Nash
Equilibria specifically tailored to robotics applications.
Our solver assumes that players are rational agents acting
to minimize their costs. This rational behavior is formulated
using the first-order necessary condition for Nash equilibria,
analogous to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
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in optimization. By relying on an augmented Lagrangian
approach to robustly handle constraints, the solver is able to
solve multi-player games with numerous agents and a high
level of interactions at speeds approaching real-time. Our
primary contributions are:
1) A general solver for dynamic games aimed at identi-
fying Generalized Nash Equilibrium strategies.
2) Demonstration of the solver’s speed, robustness, and
scalability in autonomous driving applications (Fig. 1).
II. RELATED WORK
A. Equilibrium Selection
Recent work focused on solving multi-player dynamic
games can be categorized by the type of equilibrium they
select. Several works [2], [3], [9], [13] opted for the search
of Stackelberg equilibria, which models an asymmetry of in-
formation between players. It is usually formulated for games
with two players, a leader and a follower. The leader chooses
his strategy first, then the follower selects the best response
to the leader’s strategy. Alternatively, a Nash equilibrium
does not introduce hierarchy between players; each player’s
strategy is the best response to the other players’ strategies.
As pointed out in [6], searching for open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium strategies can fall flat on simple examples. In the
context of autonomous driving, for instance, when players’
cost functions only depend on their own state and control
trajectories, the solution becomes trivial. The leader can
ignore mutual collision constraints and the follower has to
adapt to this strategy. This behavior can be overly aggressive
for the leader (or overly passive for the follower) and does
not capture the game-theoretic nature of the problem.
Search for Nash equilibria has been investigated in [4], [5],
[8], [14]. We also take the approach of searching for Nash
equilibria, as this type of equilibrium seems better suited
to symmetric, multi-robot interaction scenarios. Indeed, we
have observed more natural behavior emerging from Nash
equilibria compared to Stackelberg when solving for open-
loop strategies.
B. Game-Theoretic Trajectory Optimization
Most of the algorithms proposed in the robotics literature
to solve for game-theoretic equilibria can be grouped into
three types. First, algorithms relying on a decomposition
method such as Jacobi or Gauss-Siedel methods [8], [14],
[15]. These algorithms are based on an iterative best response
scheme. All the players take turns at improving their strate-
gies, considering the other agents’ strategies as immutable. It
is aimed at finding Nash equilibria. This type of approach is
easy to interpret and handles games with numerous players
well. However, convergence of these algorithms is not well
understood [12], and special care is required to capture the
game-theoretic nature of the problem [8]. Moreover, solving
for a Nash equilibrium until convergence can require many
iterations, each of which is a (possibly expensive) trajectory
optimization problem. This can lead to prohibitively long
solution times.
Second, there are a variety of algorithms based on dynamic
programming. In [6], a Markovian Stackelberg strategy is
computed via dynamic programming. This approach seems
to capture the game-theoretic nature of autonomous driving.
However, dynamic programming suffers from the curse of
dimensionality, and therefore relies on a simplified dynamics
model coupled with a coarse discretization of the state
and input space. To counterbalance these approximations, a
lower-level planner informed by the state values under the
Markovian Stackelberg strategy is run. This approach, which
scales exponentially with the state dimension, has only been
demonstrated in a two-player setting. Adding more players
would prevent real-time application of this algorithm. Our
proposed approach, on the contrary, scales reasonably with
the number of players (see Fig. 4).
Finally, algorithms akin to differential dynamic program-
ming have been developed for robust control [16] and later
applied to game-theoretic problems [4]. This approach scales
polynomially with the number of players and is potentially
fast enough to run real-time in a model predictive control
(MPC) fashion. However, this approach does not handle con-
straints. Collision-avoidance constraints are typically han-
dled using large penalties that can result in numerical ill-
conditioning and a brittle solver. Moreover, it leads to a trade-
off between trajectory efficiency and avoiding collisions
with other players. This approach seems questionable in the
autonomous driving context. Our approach, however, can
enforce nonlinear state and input constraints in a rigorous
way.
C. Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
As mentioned above, we focus on finding Nash equilibria
for multi-player games in which players are coupled through
shared state constraints (such as collision-avoidance con-
straints). Therefore, these problems are instances of Gener-
alized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs). The operations
research field has a rich literature on GNEPs [17], [18], [19],
[20], [21]. Exact penalty methods have been proposed to
solve GNEPs [18], [19]. Complex constraints such as those
that couple players’ strategies are handled using penalties.
This allows solution of multi-player games jointly for all
the players, while still being able to reason about complex
constraints. However, these exact penalty methods require
minimization of nonsmooth objective functions, which turns
out to be slow in practice. In the same vein, a penalty
approach relying on an augmented Lagrangian formulation
of the problem has been advanced by Pang et al. [17]. This
work, however, converts the augmented Lagrangian formula-
tion to a set of KKT conditions, including complementarity
constraints. The resulting constraint-satisfaction problem is
solved with an off-the-shelf linear complementarity problem
(LCP) solver that exploits the linearity of a specific problem.
Our solver, on the contrary, is not tailored for a specific
example and can solve general GNEPs. It draws inspiration
from this augmented Lagrangian formulation, which does not
introduce nonsmooth terms in the objective function so the
solution can be found quickly. Moreover, this formulation
avoids ill-conditioning, which makes our solver numerically
robust.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Following the formalism of Facchinei [12], we consider
the GNEP with M players. Each player ν controls the
variables pν ∈Rnp . We denote by p the concatenated vector
of the individual decision variables,
p =
[
(p1)T . . . (pM)T
]T
, (1)
with dimension q=Mnp. By p−ν , we denote the vector of
all the players’ decision variables except those of player ν .
The cost function of each player is noted Jν : Rq → R. It
depends on player ν’s variables pν as well as on all the other
players’ variables p−ν . The goal of player ν is to select a
strategy pν that minimizes his cost function Jν , given the
other players’ strategies p−ν . In addition, the strategy pν
must belong to a set Pν(p−ν), and we express this constraint
with a concatenated set of inequality constraints Cν : Rq→
Rnc . Formally,
min
pν
Jν(pν , p−ν),
s.t. Cν(pν , p−ν)≤ 0.
(2)
A solution of the GNEP (a generalized Nash equilibrium),
is a vector p¯ such that for all ν = 1, . . . ,M, p¯ν is a solution
to (2) with the other players’ strategies fixed to p¯−ν . This
means that at an equilibrium point p¯, no player can decrease
his cost by unilaterally changing his strategy pν to any other
feasible point.
In the discretized trajectory optimization setting with N
time steps, we denote by n the state size, m the con-
trol input size, xνt the state, and u
ν
t the control input of
player ν at the time step t. In this context, the decision
variables of each player pν designate the primal vari-
ables associated with this player. They are the sequences
of states Xν = [(xν1 )
T . . .(xνN)
T ]T and control inputs Uν =
[(uν1 )
T . . .(uνN−1)
T ]T of player ν , i.e.
pν =
[
(Xν)T (Uν)T
]T
. (3)
Thus, when solving for a generalized Nash equilibrium of the
game p, we identify open-loop Nash equilibrium trajectories,
in the sense that the control signal is a function of time,
not of the state variables of the players. However, one can
repeatedly resolve the open-loop game as new information
is obtained over time to obtain a policy that is closed-
loop in the model-predictive control sense. The cost function
Jν encodes the objective of player ν . The concatenated
set of constraints Cν includes dynamics constraints and,
in the context of autonomous driving, collision constraints
coupled between players. This formulation is general enough
to comprise multi-player general-sum dynamic games with
nonlinear constraint on the states and control inputs.
IV. AUGMENTED LAGRANGIAN FORMULATION
We propose an algorithm to solve the previously defined
GNEP in the context of trajectory optimization. We express
the fact that players are acting optimally to minimize their
cost functions under constraints as an equality. To do so,
we first derive the augmented Lagrangian associated with
(2) solved by each player. Then, we use the fact that, at an
optimal point, the gradient of the augmented Lagrangian is
null [22]. Therefore, at a generalized Nash equilibrium point,
the gradients of the augmented Lagrangians of all players
must be null. This is a set of M equality constraints that we
solve using a quasi-Newton root-finding algorithm.
A. Individual Optimality
First, without loss of generality, we suppose that the vector
Cν is actually the concatenated set of inequality and equality
constraints, i.e. Cν = [Cνi
T Cνe
T ]T ∈Rnci+nce , where Cνi ≤ 0 is
the vector of inequality constraints and Cνe = 0 is the vector
of equality constraints. To embed the notion that each player
is acting optimally, we formulate the augmented Lagrangian
associated with (2) for player ν . We denote by λ ν ∈Rnc the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the vector of constraints
Cν ; ρν ∈ Rnc is a penalty weight vector.
Lν(pν , p−ν) = Jν +λ νTCν +
1
2
CνT IρνCν . (4)
Where Iρν is a diagonal matrix defined as,
Iρν ,kk =
{
0 if Cνk (p
ν , p−ν)< 0 ∧ λ νk = 0, k ≤ nci,
ρνk otherwise,
(5)
where k = 1, . . . ,nci+nce indicates the kth constraint. Given
the appropriate Lagrange multipliers λ ν , the gradient of the
augmented Lagrangian with respect to the individual primal
variables ∇pν Lν =Gν is null at an optimal point of (2). The
fact that player ν is acting optimally to minimize Jν under
the constraints Cν can therefore be expressed as follows,
∇pν Lν(pν , p−ν) = Gν(pν , p−ν) = 0. (6)
It is important to note that this equality constraint preserves
coupling between players since the gradient Gν depends on
the other players’ strategies p−ν .
B. Root-Finding Problem
At a generalized Nash equilibrium, all players are acting
optimally. Therefore, to find an equilibrium point, we have
to solve the following root-finding problem,
min
p
0,
s.t. Gν(pν , p−ν)= 0, ∀ ν ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
(7)
We use Newton’s method to solve the root-finding
problem. We denote by G the concatenation of the
augmented Lagrangian gradients of all players G(p) =
[(G1)T , . . . ,(GM)T ]T . We compute the first order derivative of
G with respect to all primal variables, H = ∇pG. Newton’s
method allows us to identify a search direction δ p in the
primal variables space,
δ p =−H−1G. (8)
We couple this search direction with a backtracking line-
search [23] detailed in Algorithm 1 to ensure local conver-
gence to a solution using Newton’s Method [23] presented
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Backtracking line-search
1: procedure LINESEARCH(p,G,δ p)
2: Parameters
3: α = 1,
4: β ∈ (0,1/2),
5: τ ∈ (0,1),
6: Until ||G(p+αδ p)||2 < (1−αβ )||G(p)||2 do
7: α ← τα
8: return α
Algorithm 2 Newton’s method for root-finding problem
1: procedure NEWTON’SMETHOD(p)
2: Until Convergence do
3: G← [(∇p1 L1)T , . . . ,(∇pM LM)T ]T
4: H← ∇pG
5: δ p←−H−1G
6: α ← LINESEARCH(p,G,δ p)
7: p← p+αδ p
8: return p
Algorithm 3 ALGAMES solver
1: procedure ALGAMES(p0,ρ0)
2: Initialization
3: λ ν ← 0, ∀ν
4: ρν ← ρ0, ∀ν
5: p← p0
6: Until Convergence do
7: p← NEWTON’SMETHOD(p)
8: λ ν ← DUALASCENT(p,λ ν ,ρν), ∀ν
9: ρν ← INCREASINGSCHEDULE(ρν), ∀ν
10: return p
C. Augmented Lagrangian Updates
To obtain convergence of the Lagrange multipliers λ ν , we
update them with a dual-ascent step. This update can be seen
as shifting the value of the penalty terms into the Lagrange
multiplier terms,
λ νk ←
{
max(0,λ νk +ρ
ν
k C
ν
k (p)) k ≤ nci,
λ νk +ρ
ν
k C
ν
k (p) nci < k ≤ nci+nce.
(9)
We also update the penalty weights according to an increas-
ing schedule, with γ > 1:
ρνk ← γρνk , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,nc}. (10)
D. ALGAMES
By combining Newton’s method for finding the point
where gradients of the augmented Lagrangians are null with
the Lagrange multiplier and penalty updates, we obtain our
solver ALGAMES (Augmented Lagrangian GAME-theoretic
Solver) presented in Algorithm 3. The algorithm, which
iteratively solves the GNEP, requires as inputs an initial guess
for the primal variables p0 and initial penalty weights ρ0. The
algorithm outputs the primal variables p containing the open-
loop strategies of all players. Finding a Nash equilibrium
is a non-convex problem in general. There is, therefore, no
guarantee about convergence to the global optimum, and our
algorithm requires a reasonable initial guess to converge.
V. SIMULATIONS: DESIGN AND SETUP
We choose to apply our algorithm in the autonomous
driving context. Indeed, many maneuvers like lane changing,
ramp merging, overtaking, and intersection crossing involve
a high level of interaction between vehicles. Our game-
theoretic planner could improve performance in these in-
teractive tasks compared to traditional planners that do not
consider coupled interactions among all the vehicles. We
assume a single car is computing the trajectories for all
cars in its neighborhood, so as to find its own trajectory
to act safely among the group. In a real application, this
computation would be repeated as frequently as possible in
an MPC fashion.
A. Autonomous Driving Problem
1) Constraints: Each vehicle in the scene is an actor of the
game. Our objective is to find a generalized Nash equilibrium
trajectory for each vehicle. These trajectories have to be
dynamically feasible. The dynamics constraints at time step
t are expressed as follows,
xνt+1 = f (x
ν
t ,u
ν
t ). (11)
Although the solver is able to deal with nonlinear constraints
arising from complex dynamics models, we consider only
double-integrator dynamics. A vehicle state xνt is composed
of a 2D position and a 2D velocity. The control input uνt is the
2D acceleration. The dynamics constraints can be expressed
as,
xνt+1−Axνt −Buνt = 0. (12)
In addition, it is critical that the trajectories respect collision-
avoidance constraints. We model the collision zone of the
vehicles as circles of radius r. The collision constraints
between vehicles are then simply expressed in terms of the
position x˜νt of each vehicle,
r2−||x˜νt − x˜µt ||22 ≤ 0, ∀ ν ,µ ∈ {1, . . . ,M},ν 6= µ. (13)
We also model boundaries of the road to force the vehicles to
remain on the roadway. This means that the distance between
the vehicle and the closest point, q, on each boundary, b, has
to remain larger than the collision circle radius, r,
r2−||x˜νt −qb||22 ≤ 0, ∀ b, ∀ ν ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (14)
Finally, we enforce a final state constraint on a subset of
the state dimensions. With this constraint we can enforce,
for instance, a final velocity or a final position of the
vehicle along a particular direction. In summary, based on
reasonable simplifying assumptions, we have expressed the
driving problem in terms of both linear individual constraints
and non-convex coupled constraints.
2) Cost Function: We use a quadratic cost function penal-
izing the use of control inputs and the distance between the
current state and the desired final state xνf of the trajectory,
Jν(pν) =
N
∑
t=1
1
2
(xνt − xνf )TQ(xνt − xνf )+
1
2
uνk
TRuνk . (15)
This cost function only depends on the decision variables pν
of vehicle ν . Players’ behaviors are coupled only through
collision constraints. We could also add terms depending on
other vehicles’ strategies, such as a congestion penalty.
B. Driving Scenarios
We test our solver on three different driving scenarios
involving strong interactions between vehicles:
1) Ramp Merging: First, we set up a roadway with hard
boundaries as pictured in Fig. 1 to demonstrate a ramp-
merging maneuver. We position multiple vehicles on the
roadway in a collision-free initial configuration. We choose
a reasonable desired final state where the incoming vehicle
has merged into the traffic. We purposefully place numerous
players in a relatively confined space to maximize the level
of interaction between players. Our objective is to generate
generalized Nash equilibrium trajectories for all the vehicles.
These trajectories are collision-free and cannot be improved
unilaterally by any player.
2) Lane Changing: The objective for each vehicle is to
change lanes while avoiding collisions (Fig. 6). This situation
is challenging because it involves a high level of negotiation
[7] between drivers in a real-world setting, which results in
strongly coupled trajectories.
3) Overtaking: A fast vehicle is placed behind a slower
one (Fig. 7). The faster vehicle performs an overtaking
maneuver to maintain its desired speed.
VI. SIMULATIONS: RESULTS
A. Robustness, Speed, and Scalability
1) Robustness: To get a better understanding of the algo-
rithm, we plot the L1-norm of the concatenated gradients of
the individual Lagrangians ||G||1 and the condition number
of the second order derivative matrix H in Fig. 2. It corre-
sponds to the ramp merging experiment presented in Figure
5. The gradient curve, similar to a sawtooth wave, surges
in value due to dual-ascent updates that impact the value of
the Lagrangians. The root-finding algorithm gets the gradient
to converge towards zero in few iterations. We observe that
the condition number of H incrementally increases after
each penalty update. However, it remains in a reasonable
range during the solve. This reasonable conditioning of the
numerical problem, combined with the consistent behavior
0 20 40 60 80
10−17
10−3
1011
Iterations
||G||1
Condition(H)
Fig. 2. Behavior of the L1-norm of the gradient G and the condition
number of the matrix H during the solve.
0 20 40 60 80
10−4
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Iterations
||Car col.||∞
||Bound col.||∞
||Dynamics||∞
Fig. 3. Convergence of the constraint satisfaction during the solve for
the 3-vehicle ramp merging example. The plotted constraints are collision
avoidance between vehicles, collision avoidance with road boundaries, and
dynamic feasibility. The end of the solve is triggered when all the constraints
are satisfied up to a threshold ε = 10−2.
of the root-finding method, exhibits the robustness of the
solver. We also plot constraint satisfaction in Fig. 3, where
we observe a linear convergence of the maximum constraint
violations.
2) Scalability: Scalability of the algorithm to scenarios
with more than two players is highly desirable. Indeed,
driving problems like lane merging often involve 3 or 4
players. We solved for five-second trajectories (N = 25
time steps) while increasing number of actors from 2 to
8 on one core of an AMD Ryzen 2950x processor. Fig. 4
demonstrates near-real-time performance on scenarios with 2
and 3 players (2.5s and 6.1s respectively). The solving time
increases reasonably with the number of players. Compared
to other approaches that scale exponentially with the number
of players [6], our method is still tractable for up to 8 players
(one-minute solve time for a 5s trajectory).
B. Results From Driving Scenarios
1) Ramp Merging: As pictured in Fig. 5, we observe
that the merging vehicle in blue is squeezing between the
other two vehicles. They are adapting their trajectories to let
the blue vehicle merge smoothly. We also see that the blue
vehicle is taking a trajectory that accommodates the other
vehicles by squeezing against the ramp boundary represented
by a black line on Fig. 5. The algorithm demonstrates
near real-time performance as it takes 6.1s to solve the 5s
trajectory on one core of an AMD Ryzen 2950x processor.
We then test the solver on a more complex problem with
5 vehicles. In addition to the 3 ramp-merging vehicles, we
add 2 vehicles and one of them is performing a lane change.
Fig. 1 presents the highly coupled trajectories that we obtain.
We observe that the red and green vehicles are slightly
nudging on their right to accommodate for the yellow vehicle
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Fig. 4. Solving time and number of iterations required to reach the
constraint satisfaction threshold vs. the number of players. All scenarios
from 2 to 8 players are of comparable complexity. They include one ramp
merging and multiple lane changes when the number of players is sufficient.
Fig. 5. Ramp merging scenario: the blue vehicle successfully merges on
the highway by squeezing between the other two vehicles.
overtaking them. This example demonstrates the robustness
of the solver to complex multi-player interactions as well as
its scalability. This 5s trajectory is solved in 25.1s.
2) Lane Changing: In Fig. 6, we see the 5s trajectory
computed in 2.3s in the lane changing scenario. The orange
vehicle starts behind the blue one, but with a higher desired
speed. To respect its desired speed while achieving lane
change, it passes the blue vehicle before changing lanes.
3) Overtaking: The five-second overtaking trajectory
computed in 4.2s is presented in Fig. 7. We simply place
a vehicle with high speed behind a slower vehicle. The cost
function is strongly penalizing deviation from the desired
speed along the roadway axis and encouraging the vehicles
to end their trajectories in the right lane. This is sufficient
to trigger an overtaking maneuver by the faster vehicle. The
slower vehicle slightly nudges towards the boundary of the
road to accommodate the overtaking vehicle’s trajectory.
4) Rich Autonomous Behavior: Our solver can handle cost
functions that depend on the decision variables of all the
players p. However, we tested our solver with a cost function
only dependent on the individual decision variables of each
player pν . In this simple setting, the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium is trivial [2], [3]. The leader chooses his strategy
first, ignoring collision constraints. The follower then selects
a strategy that has to account for the collision constraints
considering the leader’s trajectory as immutable. On the
contrary, our approach converges to trajectories that account
for the individual objective of all players while sharing the
responsibility of avoiding collisions, even with “egoistic”
cost functions. The conclusion from these experiments is that
solving for Nash equilibrium apparently produces natural-
looking trajectories.
Fig. 6. Lane changing scenario: the two vehicles successfully change lanes.
Fig. 7. Overtaking scenario: successful overtaking maneuver.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a new algorithm for finding Nash
equilibrium trajectories. We demonstrated the speed and
robustness of the solver on complex autonomous driving
scenarios including nonlinear and non-convex constraints.
We have shown near-real-time performance for up to 3
players. In a real-world driving application, replanning would
be performed as frequently as possible to give a feedback
policy in the sense of MPC. Parallelizing the computation
of both the sparse matrix H and the gradient G should
lead to large reductions in solution time, enabling true real-
time performance in many realistic scenarios. Indeed, these
computations are decomposable across the number of players
and the number of time steps. We intend to exploit this
enticing property in future work.
The results we obtained from ALGAMES are promising
as they seem to let the vehicles share the responsibility for
avoiding collisions, leading to seemingly natural trajectories
where players are able to negotiate complex, interactive traf-
fic scenarios that are challenging for traditional, non-game-
theoretic trajectory planners. For this reason, we believe that
this solver could be a very efficient tool to generate trajec-
tories in situations where the level of interaction between
players is strong.
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